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Privacy and the Health Information Domain:
Properties, Models and Unintended Results
NICOLAS P. TERRY'
Introduction
Health privacy is not binary; it is difficult to find anyone who opposes the abstract
concept of protecting personal health information.2 For a non-binary issue, how-
ever, the subject is remarkably controversial. This article identifies and explores
three reasons for the continuing controversy. First, the article details how privacy
is only one "property" of the broad and quite complex health information domain.
Second, it describes the different models available to regulators seeking to protect
patient information and the operational choices made by mature regional and
national legal systems. Third, the article briefly notes some of the unexpected and
occasionally unwelcome results that follow from applying these protective models
to the health information domain.
The Health Information Domain
The traditional and somewhat Panglossian concept of patient privacy does not fit
well with the modem health information domain. As it has with other information
domains, technology has dramatically changed the way patient health information
can be acquired, stored, aggregated, processed, accessed and distributed. More
specifically, the social, economic, and, now even, security uses3 of health informa-
tion are in almost continual tension with the domain's more patient-oriented
properties.
The health information domain has several key properties that extend beyond
traditional confidentiality, which is inherent in the physician-patient relationship,
into the modem realm which is data protection. Individually, they are privacy,
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confidentiality, anonymity, access, unity (or comprehensiveness), security, integrity
and quality.
Privacy, Confidentiality & Anonymity
Traditionally, privacy and confidentiality have been used interchangeably in
discussions of health information. In fact, they have diverse functions and, frequent-
ly, quite different juridical underpinnings. Confidentiality places limits on dis-
closure, while privacy is functionally an antecedent to confidentiality, limiting
data collection. Anonymity enhances privacy by frustrating the collection of
personal identifiers.
Access
Access is not a difficult concept. In practice, however, it creates immense problems
because of the sheer number of persons, processes and institutions asserting access
needs or "rights." The health information domain has long included the access
property, establishing a multitude of public health and law enforcement exceptions
to any privacy regime. Traditionally, public health provisions and those requiring
access for judicial process4 were broadly stated. In contrast, some modem public
health provisions, such as those designed to combat AIDS/HIV, encourage reporting
by explicitly limiting the access property.5
The most recent complication to the access property is the imperative to reduce
medical 6 and medication7 error. Regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have
taken the position that reporting errors8 or publicly disseminating outcome data9
will encourage safer practices or, at least, increase consumer choice.
The access property is also being shaped by fundamental changes in the practice
of medicine and shifts in the physician-patient relationship. Today, it is far more
likely that a patient's care will be shared between several providers, and each will
require access to a comprehensive medical record. Equally, the respect for patient
autonomy, particularly choice,' ° and the responsibility for care that a patient now
shares with her healthcare providers requires that a patient be given access to her
own records.
Unity
The realities of modem healthcare and the evolving physician-patient relationship
are changing our perception of the patient record just as they broadened the access
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property. Modem, high quality healthcare requires that all information relating
to a patient be contained in a single (or longitudinal) record. The implications of
such a requirement, that the health information be comprehensive (and potentially
include genetic data of family members) and centralized, increases the level of
risk in the event of unauthorized access to an electronic health record.
Security, Integrity & Quality
The security property of the health information domain is, in essence, a correlate
to the confidentiality property--essentially limiting contact with patient information
to those with access rights. In practice, data security, involving both physical and
electronic protections, extends considerably beyond protections provided under
privacy and confidentiality systems." Furthermore, providers have incentives
to maintain the security of their proprietary information, information that might
not otherwise be protected under privacy systems.
Data integrity goes beyond protecting against simple unauthorized access by
seeking to ensure that patient information is safe against unauthorized alterations.
Integrity is closely related to the broader quality property. Even though the integrity
property refers to the data's quality, it does little more than apply a checksum,
judging the data's quality by reference to its known and intrinsic attributes. The
quality property also refers to the data's accuracy and whether the electronic patient
record (EPR) is up-to-date. This quality property is in the process of expanding
as external factors, such as the pervasive influence of clinical practice guidelines
(CPGs) and the development of clinical decision support systems (CDSS), influence
the health information domain.
These different properties of the health information domain have diverse
drivers. Traditional and professional ethical constructs drive confidentiality, while
self-determination and patient autonomy concepts drive privacy, anonymity, and
patient access. Improving quality and accountability in healthcare delivery are
dominant forces that increasingly drive access, unity and integrity. These properties
are frequently in tension with one another, making the regulation of the domain
particularly challenging.
Health Privacy Models
Three broad models for protecting patient health information have emerged in
mature regional and national legal systems. They may be loosely described as
representation-centric, collection-centric, and disclosure-centric models. These are
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not mutually exclusive models, and they do not equally impact all properties in
the health information domain.
A representation-centric model is not concerned with the appropriateness,
effectiveness, or reach of a healthcare provider's privacy policy. Rather, it con-
centrates on whether the entity has declared such a policy then complies with it.
The representation-centric model was the default model utilized by the world's
consumer protection agencies during the infancy of e-Health and prior to the
maturation of collection and disclosure models.'"
The limitations of a representation-centric system are self-evident. Not all actors
in the health information domain will express such a policy. Even published
policies may not be particularly robust. 13 We should also be mindful of the
language that product and service providers have historically chosen which
ostensibly grants additional rights to consumers but undercuts them in practice. 4
These concerns are alleviated only to a limited extent by the increasing interest
displayed by healthcare providers in acquiring accreditation 5 or trust-marks 6
for some of their technologically-mediated activities. Applying such external
standards not only increases the level of self-imposed privacy protection but also
raises the likelihood that breaches of such policies will be reported. In the United
States, both federal 7 and state" legislators have considered bills that would
remove some of the voluntarism presently found in the publication of privacy
policies, for example, by mandating compliance with published privacy policies
(sensitive to other properties in the domain) and disclosure of breaches of privacy
or security.
Mature privacy systems tend to look beyond representation-centric systems
and adopt collection-centric or disclosure-centric regulation. The former applies
privacy properties that restrict what data may be collected in what circumstances
and by which actors. In contrast, a disclosure-centric system applies confidentiality
properties, typically leaving the collection of data and possibly some of the proces-
sing unregulated.
Once a disclosure-centric model has been selected, the focus shifts to the
exceptions: should the use or disclosure of information be absolutely restrained
or should almost any use or disclosure be permitted if the data subject gives her
consent or authorization. The US position is resolutely consent-based, even with
regard to the use of medical data for marketing purposes unrelated to the patient's
health. In contrast, the data directive gives to member states the option of making
some data inalienable.' 9
Neither the collection-centric nor the disclosure-centric models are without
problems when applied to the health information domain. For example, quality
is severely compromised if the patient's data set is incomplete because of limita-
tions on collection. Equally, applying strong disclosure-centric rules can jeopardize
the access to information in shared care scenarios.
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The most mature (although maturity is relative in this emerging field) systems
are those of the Europe Community, the United States and Australia. As will be
seen from the brief summaries that follow, Europe, at least in principal, has favored
a collection-centric legislation. The United States is taking a purely disclosure-
centric approach to health privacy based on a strict compliance model. On the
other hand, the Australian system mixes collection-centric and disclosure-centric
principles and features a particularly broad array of enforcement approaches,
particularly by way of guidelines issued by its Federal Privacy Commissioner.
Europe
The standard-bearer of a collection-centric privacy model has been the 1995
European Community data directive.20 The directive carries with it the promise
of a rigorous collection-centric approach to health privacy, stating: "[Plersonal
data must be ... collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes.'
The directive also regulates the disclosure of health information, prohibiting
the "processing of data concerning health ... Exceptions apply when the patient
has given "explicit consent" 23 or "is physically or legally incapable of giving
his consent."2'4 Healthcare providers and public health authorities are given gen-
erous access to patient information. 25 The data directive provides for access and
limited correction rights,26 although these have been expanded by some member
states. 27 The data directive integrates highly generalized security principles into
its privacy and confidentiality scheme.28 In contrast, the regulations made under
the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) will
feature highly detailed requirements for physical and electronic security, training
and compliance.29
The member states, however, have done little to promote a true collection-
centric regime or meaningfully limit the disclosure of patient information within
the healthcare environment. For example, the 1998 English Data Protection Act
vests health information with the elevated protection classification of "sensitive
personal data."30 In the end, however, the 1998 Act operationally places few
restrictions on data used in the context of the "provision of care and treatment
and the management of healthcare services."'" The UK among other European
states is examining alternative protective models and has issued a consultative
document on the health information domain.32
Given that European law has not delivered a collection-centric regime, it has
not been the most successful proponent of the privacy property. In contrast,
however, it is making considerable progress towards a robust anonymity construct.
For example, the new data Directive on electronic communications requires non-
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itemized billing, regulates caller identification options, and requires providers to
anonymize global positioning-type location data.
33
United States
America's trading partners are aware that successive US administrations have been
less than forthcoming on data protection for consumers. The Clinton administration
narrowly avoided a trade "war" with the EU over the extraterritorial application
of the original data directive.34 Under the Bush administration, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has turned its back on introducing any general privacy pro-
tection 35 and has retreated from the child online privacy rules introduced by the
previous administration.36
With such a lackluster history, it is perhaps no surprise that the US "backed
into" health privacy. Under the 1996 HIPAA Act,37 the federal government
committed to a process of "Administrative Simplification" to reduce healthcare
costs. The primary component of the now infamous HIPAA initiative is the
enabling of a national Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for the US healthcare
industry. An EDI vastly increases the collection and flow of patient data and
thereby increasing the privacy "risk" to patients. The HIPAA statute made clear
that regulatory limits would have to be placed on how far the healthcare industry
could externalize these risks to patients.38 Notwithstanding, the Standards for
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information 39 (PIHI), released during
the final weeks of the Clinton administration but not generally applicable until
early 2003, surprised many with their substantive complexity and rigorous compli-
ance requirements. Initially, the incoming Bush administration was highly critical
of the regulations.4" This was followed by grudging acquiescence.4 1 Within a
year, however, the new administration promulgated, after furious lobbying by the
health industry, substantial amendments to the regulations.42 These amendments
have themselves proven quite controversial, particularly the manner in which the
Bush administration abandoned the requirement for consent prior to disclosure
of patient data for "treatment, payment or healthcare operations" (TPO). It is
possible that these amended regulations themselves will be countered with legis-
lative action.43
Conceptually, the PIHI standards as they exist today are similar to the statutory
controls that exist in a small minority of US states. 44 The federal rules do not
preempt more rigorous state patient privacy protections. They are less compre-
hensive and considerably less comprehensible than existing state and model
45
laws largely because of the difficulties faced by the drafters in managing the
limitations of the enabling legislation. 46 For example, the enabling HIPAA legisla-
tion was not written broadly enough for the PIHI regulations to apply to all "data
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controllers" as seen in the Directive.47 This created considerable problems for
the US regulators seeking to protect health data that was distributed to those outside
of the healthcare industry.48 Compared to common law concepts of confidentiality
and privacy and even state legislation, the PIHI regulations are ruthlessly specific,
clearly preferring compliance minutiae to general statements of principle.
The PIHI regulations apply to providers such as hospitals, health insurers and
physicians that "transmit any health information in electronic form in connection
with a [health-EDI transaction] .'49 The regulations limit the disclosures that
affected providers may make of "protected health information" (PHI);5" a concept
that in practice is functionally similar to the Directive's "personal [health] data."'"
PIHI places no limitations on the collection of health data. It is a classic
disclosure-centric system but, particularly after the Bush administration amend-
ments, one that promises more than it delivers. First, the regulations limit use and
disclosure with a "minimum necessary" rule,52 but derogate from that rule in
cases of treatment or when law requires the disclosure.53 Second, PIHI invokes
gradated levels of access permissions, dependent on the type of information
utilization contemplated. These permissions include pennitted disclosure to a broad
range of public health, law enforcement, and judicial authorities as required by
law and subject to various conditions 54 and authorized (i.e., consented-to) dis-
closures for other purposes such as some (and only some) forms of marketing.55
The Bush amendments removed any requirements of consent for data used for
TPO purposes.56
Given the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding the PIHI regulations, it
is not surprising that privacy advocates have been generally protective of HIPAA.
This politically-motivated support tends to distract attention from the very severe
limitations in HIPAA's privacy construct. While imperfect and unnecessarily
complex, the HIPAA privacy regulations do protect patients in many of their
interactions with bricks-and-mortar providers. The same cannot be said for most
consumer interactions with online providers. It is well known that health web sites
on both sides of the Atlantic have failed to establish acceptable standards of data
protection, 57 yet most "pure-play" e-health sites are untouched by the PIHI regula-
tions.58
Australia
In Australia, both the federal (Commonwealth) and state59 governments are ag-
gressively pursuing the protection of patient information. The federal Privacy Act
of 1988 was passed to implement OECD privacy guidelines.' In 2000, the Priv-
acy Amendment (Private Sector) Act extended the operation of the Privacy Act
of 1988 to cover the private sector, including healthcare.6
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This more recent legislation introduced the so-called National Privacy Prin-
ciples. 62 These principles are broadly sensitive to the needs of the health informa-
tion domain and reference two protective models: collection-centric (by placing
limits on collection63 and granting consumers anonymity rights') and disclosure-
centric models. 65 The principles also address data quality,
66 data security, 61
and access rights.68 The 1988 Act established the position of Federal Privacy
Commissioner, 69 a position that becomes even more crucial under the 2000 Act
since the Commissioner issues sector-specific privacy guidelines.7 ° In late 2001,
the Commissioner issued his non-binding but influential initial Guidelines on
Privacy in the Private Health Sector.7 To a large extent, these guidelines map
the National Privacy Principles to the health context.
The Guidelines suggest a robust collection-centric approach. In most cases,
consent is required prior to collecting patient health information. This consent
should include disclosure of the purposes for which the information is being
collected. Further, the "[i]nformation collected should be limited to what is neces-
sary for the health service provider's functions and activities. 72
When dealing with obligations relating to collected data, the Guidelines help
distinguish between the use ("the handling of information within an organization")
and the disclosure ("the transfer of information outside the organization") of patient
information.73 Specifically, the Guidelines state that a provider should "only use
or disclose personal information for the primary purpose for which it was collected,
or for directly related secondary purposes if these fall within the reasonable
expectations of the individual..." As a result, the Guidelines contemplate a sophist-
icated matrix implicating use and disclosure, primary and secondary purposes of
collection, patient expectations, consent, and appropriate exceptions. Both fund-
raising and direct marketing to patients74 are more constrained than under the
US HIPAA regulations.
Enforcement Models
The preceding analysis has concentrated on the substantive rules protecting proper-
ties in the health information domains. An additional and extremely important
variable concerns the enforcement or process model that different jurisdictions
layer over a chosen substantive model.
There are five basic and seldom exclusive approaches to enforcing patient rights
inherent in properties of the health information domain. First, a patient may be
given a private right of action arising out of tort or warranty. Second, a legislative
scheme may expressly or impliedly provide for a private remedy based on a breach
of a statutory provision. Third, unauthorized collection or disclosure could lead
to criminal sanctions. Fourth, those who collect healthcare information could be
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subjected to detailed regulatory compliance mechanisms, breach of which may
lead to administrative, civil or criminal penalties. Fifth, investigatory, enforcement
and remedial powers may be granted to a discrete government or semi-autonomous
agency - often called a Privacy Commissioner. Such an agency may be dis-
tinguished from traditional regulatory bodies by a high level of independence, a
power to issue guidelines, and an expectation to negotiate with and mediate
between industry and patient groups. No private cause of action is permitted under
the US PIHI regulations. In fact, only a small number of the states that have passed
their own health privacy statutes expressly allow for a private right of action.75
Of course, plaintiffs may rely on established common law actions such as the tort
of breach of confidence,76 and, as one federal court has noted about the PIHI
regulations, "the Standards indicate a strong federal policy to protect the privacy
of patient medical records, and they provide guidance to the present case." 77 In
accordance with the requirements of the data directive,8 the UK Data Protection
Act recognizes a private right of action for breach of the statutory duties provided
for therein.79
The UK statute allows criminal prosecutions, ° but its processes and sanctions
are pale when compared to the compliance system envisioned by the US HIPPA
regulations. No other privacy regime has adopted such detailed compliance mechan-
isms (including appointing a "privacy officer" and training staff in privacy compli-
ance81) that underline the regulations' civil and criminal sanctions. 2
The data directive clarified the important investigatory, adjudicatory and
enforcement roles of a "supervisory authority. 83 As a result, the UK Privacy
Commissioner has the power to issue enforcement and information notices. There
is an appeal from such notices to an administrative tribunal and thereafter to the
courts.84 Similarly, the Australian Commissioner may make quasi-judicial deter-
minations of privacy breaches and move for judicial enforcement.8 5 Both the
UK 6 (taking its cue from the data directive87) and the Australian 88 commis-
sioners may encourage and then approve industry self-regulatory codes. Arguably,
among the mature legal systems, the Australian Commissioner has the broadest
89powers and functions.
Welcomed or Unintended Results
Increased regulation and enforcement within the health information domain fre-
quently have implications beyond the properties directly targeted. For example,
the practicalities of modern, high quality healthcare favor a single patient record.
Equally, our conception of access includes giving a patient access to her record.
This is a patient right currently recognized in the US, 90 Europe, and Australia.9'
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Irrespective of the appropriateness of such provisions, they will tend to increase
the liability exposure for healthcare providers.92
Other implications, however, are intentional or at least welcome. Considerable
indirect positives also flow from our emerging new patient information structures.
Privacy was placed on the US agenda because of the need for a national health
infrastructure and, therefore, a healthcare transaction EDI. That healthcare infra-
structure was necessary not only to cut costs but also to improve quality.93 Outside
the US, where health privacy itself is viewed as a social good, increased regulation
of the health information domain itself will act as an agent for change. As health-
care institutions upgrade their technologies to cope with increasing responsibilities
flowing from privacy, security, and access provisions, those technologies and
related systems will themselves enable new E-Health services. In both scenarios,
improved privacy and security accelerate the utilization and acceptability of e-health
business models and computer-mediated healthcare delivery.94
Conclusion
The Information Strategy of the UK NHS, 95 the Health Online plan of the Austra-
lian Commonwealth,96 the National Health Information Infrastructure plans of
the US federal government, 97 and the eEurope-Health Online action plan of the
European Commission 98 have much in common. Notwithstanding their different
structures and the distinct challenges they face, these major health systems have
made it clear that the health information domain is at the core of the next gen-
eration of healthcare services.
Even this cursory analysis of the major health privacy regimes raises some
challenging questions. To what extent have the architects of the mature systems
taken into account the sheer complexity and multiple properties of the health
information domain? What would empirical research tell us about the effectiveness
and efficiency of the representation, collection, and disclosure models for protecting
properties within the domain? Are there grounds for concluding that a collection-
centric model is simply unworkable in a healthcare system that is prioritizing
improvements in quality? How important is the substance of a protective privacy
model compared to its enforcement? Answers to at least some of these questions
should become available now that three influential regional and national systems
have established health privacy systems that will function as complex laboratories
and tell us much about how to legally shape the health information domain.
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